WMSCOG Opposition to Colón Motion to Dismiss – WMSCOG vs Colon, Newton VA #2011-17163

In December of 2011, the World Mission Society Church of God (WMSCOG) filed a $25 million lawsuit against the owner of this website and a former member claiming defamation among other things. Below are the relevant court documents. As you know, everything posted here on examiningthewmscog.com is well researched, well cited, and truthful to the best of my abilities (if it were not, it would be promptly corrected). More documents will be posted as they become available.

 

This is the WMSCOG‘s opposition filed on 02/27/12 to Defendant Colón’s Motion to Dismiss filed on 01/30/12.  You may read it in PDF or text format below:

WMSCOG vs Colon, Newton - VA Case #2011-17163
Timeline
WMSCOG Opposition to Defendant Colon’s Motion to Dismiss (PDF)

https://www.examiningthewmscog.com/media/court-cases/va-2011-17163/WMSCOG-Opposition-to-Colon-Motion-to-Dismiss-02-27-12.pdf

Download this PDF [8.1 MB]

WMSCOG Opposition to Defendant Colon’s Motion to Dismiss (Text)

 

CIRCUIT COURT of the COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
COUNTY of FAIRFAX
_______________________________________________________
WORLD MISSION SOCIETY CHURCH OF GOD, A NEW JERSEY NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

 

Plaintiff,        Case No.:  2011-17163

v.
MICHELE COLON AND
TYLER J. NEWTON

Defendants.

_______________________________________________________

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MICHELE COLON’S MOTION TO DISMISS

[Signature]
John W. Dozier, r., Esq. (VSB# 20559)
DOZIER INTERNET LAW, P.C.
11520 Nuckols Road, Suite 101
Glen Allen, VA 23059
Telephone: (804) 346-9770
Facsimile: (804) 346-0800
Email:  [E-mail]

 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff World Mission Society Church of God, a New Jersey non-profit corporation, (“WMSCOG” or “Plaintiff”) opposes Defendant Michele Colon’s (“Colon”) Motion to Dismiss.  As a threshold matter, Colon has waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by contesting the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in her Motion to Dismiss Notwithstanding this waiver, Plaintiff“ s Complaint sufficiently pleads facts to support personal jurisdiction over Colon through Virginia’s long-arm statute, which jurisdiction does not offend the Due Process Clause of the US. Constitution.

ARGUMENT

I. COLON HAS WAIVED PERSONAL JURISDICTION.

Colon filed a Motion to Dismiss contesting both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.  See Colon Mot. to Dismiss.  An analysis of Virginia case law shows that, without some statute or rule authorizing this type of simultaneous pleading, such a filing amounts to a waiver of the challenge of personal jurisdiction by virtue of a general appearance.  See, e.g., City of Portsmouth v. Buro Happold Consulting Eng’rs, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 255, 69 Va. Cir. 397, 400 (2005) (Almost any pleading other than a challenge to process or jurisdiction is deemed a general appearance); Norfolk & O. I/’. Ry. Co. v. Turnpike CO., 111 Va. 131, 136-137, 68 SE.  346 (1910) (A motion to vacate proceedings in a cause, or to dismiss or discontinue it, because the plaintiffs pleading does not state a cause of action, is equivalent to a demurrer and amounts to a general appearance); Ceyte v. Ceyte, 222 Va. 11, I3, 278 S.E.2d 791 (1981) (Any action taken the litigant which recognizes the case as in court will amount to a general appearance unless such action was for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction); Fisher v. Globe Brewing Co., 170 Va. 509, 512, 197 SE. 490 (1938) (Filing an affidavit of substantial defenses, pleading the general issue, or demurring amount to a general appearance.)

A. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-277

Prior to 2011, Virginia statutes only addressed the issue of waiver with respect to defective service, including lack of service within one year of commencement of the action.   See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-277.  Code § 8.01-277, enacted in 1977, modified the common law rule by allowing simultaneous pleadings where a defendant claimed defective service. City of Portsmouth, 69 Va. Cir. 397, 399 (2005).   Because Code § 8.01-277 is in derogation of the common law, it has been strictly construed and thus does not apply to properly served defendants who contest jurisdiction. See id., citing Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 581-583, 515 S.E.2d 124 (1999).

Like the defendants in the cases cited above, Colon does not claim a defect in service.  Rather, she simply objects to the Court’s exercising personal jurisdiction over her.  Yet absent the protection afforded by Virginia Code § 8.01-277 (which allows simultaneous pleadings only when objecting to a defect in service), Colon can not appear both specially and generally without subjecting herself to the jurisdiction of the court.   See City of Portsmouth, 69 Va. Cir. 397, 399 400 (2005).  Without some statute or rule authorizing simultaneous pleadings in cases where there is no objection to a defect in service, such a filing amounts to a waiver of the challenge by virtue of a general appearance.  See Id.

B. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-277.1

The Commonwealth’s 201 1 act to amend the Code of Virginia by adding section number § 8.01-277.1 provides new guidance for what does and does not constitute waiver for a properly served defendant who objects to personal jurisdiction:

A.  Except as provided in 8.01-277, a person waives any objection to personal jurisdiction or defective process if he engages in conduct related to adjudicating the merits of the case, including but not limited to:

1. Filing a demurrer, plea in bar, answer, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim;

2. Conducting discovery, except as provided in subsection B;

3. Seeking a ruling on the merits of the case; or

4. Actively participating in proceedings related to determining the merits of the case.

B. A person does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction or defective process if he engages in conduct unrelated to adjudicating the merits of the case, including, but not limited to:

1. Requesting or agreeing to an extension of time;

2. Agreeing to a scheduling order;

3. Conducting discovery authorized by the court related to adjudicating the objection;

4. Observing or attending proceedings in the case;

5. Filing a motion to transfer venue pursuant to §8.0I-264 when such motion is filed contemporaneously with the objection; or

6. Removing the case to federal court.

Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-277.1 (2011).

The plain language of Code § 8.01-277.1 states that the lists of actions constituting waiver and non-waiver are not exhaustive. The legislature did not include on either list an objection to subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, it is open for interpretation whether contesting subject matter jurisdiction at this stage in the litigation constitutes a general appearance resulting in a waiver of personal jurisdiction.  Federal law holds that an objection to subject matter jurisdiction can be either facial or factual.  See Guzman v. Anagnostis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135761, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011).  A factual attack allows the court to delve into the merits of the case by considering evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits, depositions and exhibits in order to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.  Id.  No presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations under a factual attack, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.  Id.

Here, the opportunity and ability to articulate the basis for Colon’s subject matter jurisdiction objection was hers and hers alone.  Counsel for Colon told the Court during the scheduling conference for this matter that the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case based on the religious question doctrine, although this argument appears to perhaps have died on the vine.  Nevertheless, the objection presently stands before the Court.  Colon’s failure to apprise Plaintiff and the Court of the details of her objection should be construed against her.  Colon‘s objection to subject matter jurisdiction launches a factual attack against Plaintiffs Complaint.  With this objection, Colon has, through counsel, sought a ruling on the merits of the case and actively participated in proceedings related to determining the merits of the case.  Accordingly, pursuant Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-277.1 (A) (3) and (4), Colon has waived any objection to personal jurisdiction.

II. VIRGINIA’S LONG-ARM STATUTE REACHES DEFENDANT COLON AND SUCH EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOES NOT OFFEND DUE PROCESS.

Virginia’s long arm statute reaches Colon such that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible. Va. Code § 8.01-328.1 permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who causes tortious injury by an act or omission within Virginia and who causes tortious injury in Virginia by an act or omission outside of Virginia under certain circumstances.  Colon’s own Affidavit admits that she published “statements and videos about the WMSCOG to various websites and blogs on the Internet, including the website of co Defendant Tyler Newton, www.examiningthewmscog.com.”  See Michele Colon Affidavit dated February 9, 2012, ¶ 12.  Plaintiff has alleged that Colon and Newton conspired to defame the Plaintiff as well as injure its reputation, trade, business or profession. See Complaint ¶¶ 3, 8, 11, 16, 27, 28, 67.  This Court has held that this type of conduct by a co-conspirator defendant permit it to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the long arm statute and that such an exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend the constitutional guarantees of Due Process.  See Massey Energy Co. v. UMW, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 204, 69 Va. Cir. 118, 124 (2005) citing Siu Ming H0ng v. Chum Moon Tong, 61 Va. Cir. 439, 441 (2003) Verizon Online Services v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 622 (ED. Va. 2002)); see also Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 99 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011).

A.  Standard of Review: Personal Jurisdiction.

While plaintiffs ultimately bear the burden of proving this Court has personal jurisdiction over each defend ant by a preponderance of the evidence, on a motion to dismiss a plaintiff needs only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.  See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp, 298 U.S. 178, 180, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936); Rannoch, Inc. v. The Rannoch Corp, 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (ED. Va. 1999).  The question “is one for the judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence.”  Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989).  This Court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual disputes in Plaintiffs favor.  Eastern Tech. Enters., Inc. v. Wilson & Hayes, Inc, 46 Va. Cir. 558, 560 (199?) (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993)).

Where, as here, defendant submits an affidavit denying allegations specifically pertaining to jurisdiction, “the court should not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal because to do so would allow defendant to ‘avoid personal jurisdiction simply by filing an affidavit denying all jurisdictional facts.'”  Verizon Online Servs. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (ED. Va. 2002) (quoting CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (“Dismissal in this procedural posture is proper only if all the specific facts which the plaintiff[] alleges collectively fail to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction”); see also Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 692 (D. Kan. 1978) (an afiidavit containing “bald denials of the pleaded facts will not sustain a jurisdictional challenge”).  Rather, where the parties’ allegations are contradictory, those related in Plaintiffs complaint will be accepted as true.  See Orangeburg Pecan Co. v. Farmers Inv. C0., 869 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D.S.C. 1994); Wolf v. Richmond City Hosp. Authority, ‘F45 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1984).

The determination of whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant is a two step inquiry.  The first step in analyzing the exercise of personal jurisdiction is to determine whether Virginia’s long-arm statute reaches the non-resident defendant given the cause of action alleged and the nature of the defendant’s Virginia contacts.  De Santis v. Hefner Creations, Inc, 949 F. Supp. 419, 422-23 (ED. Va. 1996) (citations omitted).  The second step is to ensure that, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant complies with the “due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  Witt v. Reynolds Metals Co., 240 Va. 452, 454, 39′? S.E.2d 873, 7 Va. Law Rep. 890 (1990).  Virginia’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, therefore the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the two inquiries essentially become one.  Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).  “The question, then, is whether the defendant has sufiicient minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95); Glumina Bank v. D. C. Diamond Corp, 259 Va. 312, 318, 527 S.E.2d T75 (2000).  The key factor in this inquiry is that “there be some act by which the defendant purposefiolly avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).

Courts have also recognized that personal jurisdiction may, in some circumstances, be based upon the acts or contacts of a co-conspirator.  Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. Am, Inc., 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 99, at * 34 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011) (citing Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Rafsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (ED. Va. 2002)).  Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, several other courts interpreting Virginia law have recognized the validity of this basis for jurisdiction.  Id.  (citations omitted).  Courts acknowledging the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction recognize that a defendant who joins a conspiracy knowing that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy have taken or will take place in the forum state is subject to personal jurisdicti0n in that forum because the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of that state and should reasonably expect to be haled into court there.  Id. at *35, citing Noble Sec., Inc., 611 F. Supp 2d at 539.

Co-conspirators are agents for each other.  Siu Ming Hang v. Chum Moon Tong, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 125, 61 Va. Cir. 439, 441 (2003) .  When co-conspirators have sufficient contacts with the forum, so that due process would not be violated, it is imputed against the foreign co-conspirator who alleges there is no sufficient contracts.  See id.  A co-conspirator is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum where “co-conspirators have sufficient contacts with the forum, so that due process would not be violated.”  Nathan, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 99, at * 35 (citations omitted).  Due process is not offended so long as the co-conspirator knew, or should have known, that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would be committed in the forum.  Id.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged a conspiracy between Colon and Newton.  Under the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, Colon can be subject to jurisdiction based on the acts of Newton that occurred in Virginia in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The underlying torts of Plaintiff’ s conspiracy claim are defamation and tortious interference.  Thus, if Newton committed acts in furtherance of these torts in Virginia, as Plaintiff alleges he has, jurisdiction can lie against Colon as a co-conspirator.

Colon is a co-conspirator.  Newton, a resident of Virginia who runs his website from Virginia and thus has significant contacts with Virginia and the alleged conspiracy, is her agent, and she is Newton’s agent.  Plaintiff alleges that the two co—authored several defamatory articles and published them to Newton’s website in Virginia.  See Victor Lozada Affidavit dated February 23, 2012 ¶ 2.  Each article in the five-part series contains an introductory paragraph that refers to Colon as the web site’s “correspondent from New Jersey.”  Id. ¶ 5.  As the website’s correspondent, Colon knew or should have known that Newton operates the website from Virginia and that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would occur in Virginia. Id. ¶ 6.  Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that acts in furtherance of the tort of defamation occurred in Virginia, whether by Colon or Newton or both.

Moreover, the defamatory five-part series appears on the web site under the tab “Former Member Testimony.”  Id. ¶ 2.  One cannot simply upload an article to this section of the web site without any connection with Newton, the owner and operator of the website.  Rather, the website has a process in place by which one would need to communicate with Newton in order to submit articles to publish on his web site.  Id. ¶ 3.  Yet the necessitous communications and procedures that must have occurred between Colon and Newton in order to have co-authored and co-published the articles through the website are unmistakably absent in Colon’s Affidavit.  Because Colon failed to disclose, and in fact has ignored, her communications with Newton and the specific processes they jointly used to publish the articles, all inferences into these communications and cooperative participation should be unfavorably construed against Colon.

B. Personal Jurisdiction under Virginia’s Long-arm Statute.

Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (A) (3 ), and (4) of Virginia’s long arm statute. Va. Code Ann. § 801-328.1. These provisions provide that:

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s:

3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth;

4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue fronl goods ‘used or consumed or services rendered, in this Commonwealth;

Id. (emphasis added).

i. Jurisdiction Pursuant to § 8.01—328.1(A)(3)

In order to find jurisdiction under Va. Code Ann § 8.01-32&1(A)(3) (2011), a plaintiff must allege a tortious injury in Virginia and that one essential act of the alleged tort occurred in Virginia.  Nathan, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 99, at *25 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011).  Plaintiff asserts that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 8.01-328.1(A)(3) because Defendants conspired to publish defamatory statements in Virginia via defendant Newton’s website, www.examiningtheWMSCOG.com.  Under Virginia law, necessary elements of the tort of defamation are (1) publication about the plaintiff, (2) an actionable statement, and (3) the requisite intent.  Chopin v. Grave, 78′? F. Supp. 557, 562 (ED. Va. 1992) (citing Michie’s Jurisprudence Libel & Slander 12).  Publication is a required element of the tort of defamation and the injury from this tort occurs where the defamatory statement is published.  See Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698 (1999); Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 408 (ED. Va. 1997).  While the defamatory articles co-authored by defendants were published to everyone with an Internet connection, there is no question that the articles were published in the Commonwealth.  Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that acts in furtherance of defamation occurred in Virginia by either Newton, a resident of the Commonwealth, or Colon, who had substantial ties to Newton as her co-conspirator.

ii. Jurisdiction Pursuant to § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)

Plaintiff also asserts that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 8.01-328.1(A)(4).  Section § 8.01-328.1(A)(4) provides for jurisdiction where a Defendant causes “tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth.” Plaintiff has clearly alleged that Defendants conspired and caused the tort of defamation to occur within Virginia by their conspiratorial acts conducted both in Virgina and in New Jersey.

Next, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants either: 1) regularly conducted or solicited business; 2) engaged in any other persistent course of conduct; or 3) derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Virginia.  Colon says that she has done none of these acts.  Colon Aff. ¶ ¶ 18-19.  However, Newton is a resident of Virginia who satisfies all three prongs of the statute and has never challenged personal jurisdiction.  Because co-conspirators are agents of each other, Colon is subject to Virginia jurisdiction in the same respect as Newton because she knew or should have known that Newton resided in Virginia and that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would occur in Virginia Thus, personal jurisdiction over Colon is proper based upon the Virginia contacts and connections of her co-conspirator, Newton, to this Commonwealth.

C. Due Process

The absence of physical contact or presence in the state will not defeat jurisdiction so long as the defendant is deliberately engaged in efforts within the state.  Verizon Online Servs. v. Rafsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10224 (ED. Va. 2002).  It does not offend due process to impute the acts alleged in the Complaint to Colon, whether she performed them herself, or whether they were performed collaboratively by her co-conspirator Newton.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently made a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 8.01-328.1(A)(3) and (4) as to Colon and has satisfied the constitutional requirements of Due Process.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny Defendant Colon’s Motion to Dismiss this action in its entirety and require her to file a responsive pleading to Plaintiff‘ s Complaint.

WORLD MISSION SOCIETY CHURCH OF GOD,
A NEW JERSEY NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
By Counsel

[Signature]
John W. Dozier, r., Esq. (VSB# 20559)
DOZIER INTERNET LAW, P.C.
11520 Nuckols Road, Suite 101
Glen Allen, VA 23059
Telephone: (804) 346-9770
Facsimile: (804) 346-0800
Email:  [E-mail]

 

Exhibit A

 

CIRCUIT COURT of the COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
COUNTY of FAIRFAX
_______________________________________________________
WORLD MISSION SOCIETY CHURCH OF GOD, A NEW JERSEY NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

 

Plaintiff,        Case No.:  2011-17163

v.
MICHELE COLON AND
TYLER J. NEWTON

Defendants.

_______________________________________________________

 

AFFIDAVIT OF VICTOR LOZADA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MICHELE COLON’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Victor Lozada, on his oath deposes and says:

1.  I am the Senior Deacon of Plaintiff church.  As such, I am familiar with the facts of the case and those described herein.  I make this Affidavit in support of Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Colon’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

2.  The defamatory articles co-authored by Colon and Newton appear in the section of the Website entitled “Former Member Testimony.”  A copy of this portion of the Website is attached as Exhibit A.

3.  According to the Website, in order to submit an article to the “Former Member Testimony” section of the Website, one needs to click on the “Click Here To Submit Your Story” link at the bottom of the web page, which links to the “Contact” page where one would need to then type in his or her name, email address, email address confirmation, subject, and message, and then click to “submit” the information to Defendant Newton.  See Exhibit B.

4.  Each article in the defamatory five-part series posted in the “Former Member Testimony” section of the Website appears to be co-authored by Newton and Colon.  Newton purportedly having at a minimum authored an introduction and conclusion paragraph to each of the five defamatory articles.  See Exhibit C.

5.  The introduction paragraph to each of the five defamatory articles in the five-part series refers to Colon as the Website’s “correspondent from New Jersey.”  Id.

6.  Colon knew or should have known from her communications with Newton that he is a resident of Virginia an that he operates the website in Virginia.  Attached as Exhibit D is the Whois record for the website which clearly shows the registrant, administrative contact, and technical contact for the website all located in Merrifield, Virginia.

 

Dated:  February 23, 2012

[Signature]
Victor Lozada

 

[Signature of Notary Public]

 

Exhibit A

[Screenshot of Former Member Testimony]

Exhibit B

[Screenshot of Contact page]

Exhibit C

[Screenshot of How the WMSCOG Turned My Life Upside Down Parts 1-5]

Exhibit D

[Screenshot of WHOIS Record for www.examiningthewmscog.com]




This document is part of a larger court case filed against this site and a former member by the World Mission Society Church of God (WMSCOG) in Dec 2011. For more documents from the court case see the timeline below:

WMSCOG vs Colon, Newton - VA Case #2011-17163
Timeline